This paper reveals that brokers and financial advisors ultimately serve as the true decision makers behind investments into load funds. In terms of the current SEC investigation as to whether they have abused their influence on investors, when there exists conflict of interests, brokers and financial advisors apparently serve their own interests by guiding investors into funds with higher loads. As a result, fund families have been steadily increasing fund loads since the mid 1990s. However, without apparent conflict of interests, brokers and financial advisors might exhibit similar behaviors as no-load fund investors in chasing past performance and investing in fund families with more options. Even better, they are more likely to direct load fund investors into smaller funds, which might experience better performance, while no-load fund investors flock into larger funds with better visibility. 
Mutual funds have become an increasingly important investment vehicle for individual investors. By the end of 2001, more than half of the 105.5 million U.S. households had invested in mutual funds. 1 In general, an individual mutual fund investor may either invest in load funds, which are primarily sold through brokers and financial advisors, or no-load funds, which largely rely on direct sales to investors. Nanda, Narayanan, and
Warther (2000) suggest that different investor clienteles might exist for load and no-load funds, with load funds catering to unsophisticated investors. Various surveys have corroborated that no-load fund investors are more sophisticated and rely primarily on fund prospectuses and financial publications to make independent investment decisions.
Load fund investors, on the other hand, are generally viewed as less informed, and they often consider brokers and financial advisors the most important information source [Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996), Investment Company Institute (1997) , and Alexander, Jones, and Nigro (1998) ]. Consequently, a natural question to investigate is what role brokers and financial advisors play in the investments into load funds, which now account for 75 percent of total retail mutual funds. Who are the true decision makers behind investments into load funds, investors or brokers and financial advisors?
How do brokers and financial advisors influence the investments into load funds? Little research has been done to study these issues, and this paper intends to fill this void in the current literature.
To investigate the role of brokers and financial advisors, this paper first studies the effects of fund loads on the net flows into load funds. As noted in Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) , as a component of the expenses encountered by mutual fund investors, fund loads are used primarily to compensate brokers and financial advisors. Consequently, if load fund investors are the primary investment decision makers, we would expect that fund loads have a negative effect on flows, because, all else being equal, rational investors should stay away from funds with higher expenses, and, in particular, higher loads, since they are salient in-your-face fees, as argued by Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002) . However, if brokers and financial advisors are the true investment decision makers instead, flows should be positively associated with fund loads, because higher loads, as suggested by Sirri and Tufano (1998) , should motivate brokers and financial advisors to sell more aggressively. Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) have studied the effects that fund loads and changes in loads have on flows, respectively. 2 However, how this paper studies the effects of fund loads differs from the literature in the following ways. First, in the current literature, the effects of fund loads are investigated using a data set of both load funds and no-load funds. Two offsetting effects might be combined in such a setting and cannot be distinguished from one another. Sophisticated investors might simply stay away from any load fund, generating a negative effect for fund loads.
However, for the clientele who do invest in load funds, the stronger incentives due to the higher compensation to brokers and financial advisors from higher loads might actually lead to higher flows, indicating a positive relationship between fund loads and flows. In other words, using a data set of both load funds and no-load funds, the effects of fund loads on flows might be non-linear: no-load funds and high-load funds might both receive higher flows than low-load funds. Consequently, in this paper, to isolate the effect of loads on flows into load funds, I first only include observations from load funds in the estimation. 3 In estimations using both load funds and no-load funds, I include both load fund dummies and load levels to control for the non-linearity. Second, partially due to data limitations, most papers in the literature only include front-end load funds in their study and treat fund loads simply just as front-end loads. In this paper, I further disaggregate load funds according to load types into front-end load funds, back-end load funds, and level-load funds and study the effects of front-end and back-end loads separately. Such a practice sheds more light on the decision-making process of investments into different types of load funds. Furthermore, the effects of fund loads have not been employed to investigate the role of brokers and financial advisors in the literature.
In addition to the study of the effects of fund loads on flows into load funds, I also follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) in comparing other determinants of flows into load and no-load funds, and use the observed differences to infer the role played by brokers and financial advisors in the investments into load funds. I also disaggregate load funds according to load types and study their determinants of flows separately.
I first find that load funds with higher loads and 12b-1 fees tend to receive higher flows. As a result, fund families have been steadily increasing fund loads since the mid 1990s to make their funds more attractive to brokers and financial advisors. This finding reveals that brokers and financial advisors ultimately serve as the true decision makers 3 Sirri and Tufano (1998) also estimate the determinants of flows for load and no-load funds separately. As noted in Section II. D. of Siiri and Tufano (1998) , the authors "estimate the models of Table III separately for load and no-load funds" but decide not to report the results. However, fund loads or changes in loads are unlikely to be included in these separate estimations, because they do not appear in Table III. behind investments into load funds. This finding also documents that, when there is conflict of interests between investors and brokers or financial advisors, brokers and financial advisors serve their own interests by guiding investors into funds with higher loads. NASD Rule 2110 requires that a member shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade in the conduct of business.
The self-serving behavior of brokers and financial advisors is apparently not consistent with Rule 2110. The fact that fund loads are fully disclosed public information does not make the behavior of brokers and financial advisors excusable. The "uninformed" load fund investors should not be expected to have access to such information and be able to monitor the behavior of brokers and financial advisors. In fact, the lack of information is exactly the reason why load fund investors pay brokers and financial advisors for their service.
In light of the current investigation by the Securities & Exchange Commission as to whether brokers and financial advisors have abused their influence on mutual fund investors, this finding is of great importance to regulators, mutual fund investors, and fund management companies alike. First, the SEC has been reported to consider charges over Morgan Stanley's "favored sale" of fund companies' products based on brokerage commissions that Morgan Stanley would receive from those fund companies. 4 This finding reveals that such "favored sale" practice is not limited to Morgan Stanley, but spread all over the entire brokerage industry, and entails thorough investigation by the SEC. Second, for load fund investors, this finding helps them understand that they are in a vulnerable position in their relationship with brokers and financial advisors, who are sales people first, and advisors second.
On the other hand, when an apparent conflict of interests does not seem to exist, this paper also finds that brokers and financial advisors might exhibit similar behaviors as no-load fund investors in chasing past performance (both raw returns and risk-adjusted returns) and investing in fund families with more options. Even better, they are more likely to direct load fund investors into smaller funds, which might experience better performance than larger funds exceeding their optimal size, while no-load fund investors flock into larger funds with better visibility. In addition, I also find that, although noload funds as a group have lost market share in recent years, no-load funds still receive higher flows on average than any type of load funds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the data, the variables, and the methodology to be used. Section 2 discusses the estimation results.
Section 3 concludes.
1.
Data, Variables, and Methodology The data include fund name, fund family (management company), inception date, fund age (months), quarterly return, NAV (net asset value), expense ratio, turnover ratio, front-end loads, back-end loads, 12b-1 fees, and total assets. More than 60 percent of the funds are different share classes of a common portfolio. 8 To examine and compare the effects of different types of loads, which are specific to each share class, on flows, following Greene and Hodges (2002) , this paper studies flows to each share class instead 6 Domestic equity funds accounted for only 39 and 64 percent of the total number and total assets of mutual funds (excluding money market funds) at the end of the third quarter of 2001, respectively. 7 Among all ICDI's Fund Objectives, Money Market Funds and Special Funds, which are primarily currency funds, are excluded. Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) are also excluded. Utility Funds are combined into Sector Funds. To be consistent with most mutual fund research [Pastor and Stambaugh (2002), and Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) About 75 percent of all funds target retail investors, and retail mutual funds can be disaggregated by load types into no-load funds and three categories of load funds:
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front-end load funds, back-end load funds, and level-load funds. 9 Front-end load funds charge a front-end load and a 12b-1 fee but not a back-end load; back-end load funds charge a back-end load and a 12b-1 fee but not a front-end load; and, level-load funds charge a much smaller back-end load (less than two percent) and a 12b-1 fee but not a front-end load. No-load funds, on the other hand, charge neither a front-end load nor a back-end load, but may charge a 12b-1 fee (if any) less than 25 basis points. 10 Load funds are generally sold through brokers and financial advisors, while no-load funds largely rely on direct sales to investors. 11 The loads and 12b-1 fees are used primarily to compensate brokers and financial advisors and to pay for distribution expenses.
At the beginning of 1992, as shown in Figure 1 , the composition of retail mutual funds was dominated by front-end load funds and no-load funds, accounting for 46 percent and 39 percent of all funds, respectively, while back-end load funds and level-9 Some "all-load" funds charge both a front-end load and a back-end load. Considering that such funds only account for 3.15 percent of all funds (500 out of 15,853 funds), they are not included in this study. 10 The definition of no-load funds follows NASD Rule 2830(d 
Related literature and control variables
As noted in the introduction, using a data set of both load funds and no-load funds, Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) investigate the effects of fund loads and the change in loads on fund flows, respectively. Sirri and Tufano (1998) also find mutual fund investors are fee-sensitive in that funds with higher total fees (expense ratio plus amortized load assuming a seven-year holding period) have lower flows. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, even though they realize the importance, they are unable to perform a full sample investigation of the effects of different fee components, such as 12b-1 fees. Using more recent data, Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002) study the effects of front-end loads, 12b-1 fees, and other operating expenses separately. They find negative relations between load fees and fund flows, no relation between total operating expenses and fund flows, as well as positive relations between 12 The development of load funds to a large extent can be attributed to the proliferation of funds with multiple share classes. At the end of the third quarter of 2001, 94.92 percent of load funds (6,507 out of 6,855 funds) are share classes from funds with multiple share classes.
12b-1 fees and fund flows. They argue that mutual fund investors are more sensitive to salient in-your-face fees, such as loads, than operating expenses. Wilcox (2003) draws similar conclusions using a conjoint experiment. Apparently, in addition to fund loads, 12b-1 fees and operating expenses should also be included as control variables.
The determinants of flows into mutual funds have been the subject of a growing literature of academic studies. This literature provides a number of additional control variables to include in the investigation. Gruber (1996) , for instance, finds that investors chase past performance. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) not only corroborate this finding but also detect the non-linearity in the performance-flow relationship: mutual fund investors flock to funds with the highest recent returns, but fail to flee from poor performers. Sirri and Tufano (1998) , Nanda, Wang, and Ivkovic (2002) all study the spillover effects -a fund might enjoy higher flows if the fund family it belongs to has larger size, a star fund with superior performance, or impressive overall family performance. In addition, the effects of other factors, such as fund size, previous flows, and fund age, have also been studied in the above-mentioned papers and other studies [Jain and Wu (2000) , Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) , and James and Karceski (2002) ].
In addition to the factors already studied in previous research, this paper introduces two new variables to control for the effects of fund families and investment objectives on the flows into a fund. First, this paper includes the number of investment objectives offered in the fund family. By offering more investment objectives, the fund family provides investors with greater flexibility to switch among funds and a better opportunity to execute asset allocation strategies. The number of investment objectives offered by a fund family, therefore, might influence investor behavior. This variable is included to capture the spillover effects within a fund family from a different angle.
Second, since this paper follows Sirri and Tufano (1998) in measuring fund performance as its percentile performance relative to other funds with the same investment objective in the same period, the asset-weighted average raw return of the corresponding investment objective is also included to control for the effect of investors chasing the absolute performance of an investment objective.
Definitions of variables

Flows
Consistent with the literature, I define dollar flows (FLOW) as the change in total assets in excess of appreciation. 13 I especially follow Zheng (1999) in also removing the increase in total assets due to merger so that the flow measure clearly represents only net new investments made by investors: 
Loads and Changes in Loads
Previous research largely includes only the level of front-end loads in the analysis. In addition to using a front-end load level variable, FLOAD, in the analysis of flows into front-end load funds, I also include a back-end load level variable, BLOAD, in the analysis of flows into back-end load and level-load funds. 16 To test if changes in 15 As a result, 3,458 observations are excluded, which account for 1.64 percent of all observations. 16 I understand that the front-end load reported in the CRSP mutual fund database is the maximum load a fund may charge, and might differ from the average actual load, due to breakpoints. (Back-end load funds and level-load funds do not offer breakpoints; therefore, this issue does not apply to these funds.) However, using the maximum load should not misrepresent the relative incentives faced by brokers and financial advisors. As shown in Reid and Rea (2003) , most front-end load funds follow the same breakpoint schedule, with the first load reduction at $25,000 and additional breakpoints introduced at $50,000, $100,000, $250,000, $500,000, and $1,000,000 for which the front-end load is eliminated altogether. As a result, with the same amount of new investment, the fund family offering a higher maximum load will still offer a higher actual load after breakpoint adjustments. In addition, it is infeasible to obtain average actual load information from either CRSP or the N-SAR form introduced in footnote 13. Although item 30A on the N-SAR form provides the total front-end loads in dollar terms collected for a fund, to obtain the average actual load, which should be calculated as the ratio of total front-end loads and total sales of front-end load shares, we still need information on total sales of front-end load shares. However, as explained in footnote 13, the total new sales reported in item 28 include sales from all share classes, making it infeasible to obtain total sales for just front-end load shares. Considering that load funds are predominantly share classes from funds with multiple share classes, it becomes impossible to calculate average actual load based on data available from the N-SAR form. [Investment Company loads have any immediate effect on flows, I also include changes in front-end loads (∆FLOAD) or back-end loads (∆BLOAD) in the estimations.
12b-1 Fees and Operating Expenses
As in Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002) , I subtract 12b-1 fees (12B) from the expense ratio to create a new variable, NON12B, which only represents operating expenses not related to distribution efforts.
Fund Size
Consistent with the literature, LASSET i,t , which is the natural log of ASSET i,t , the total net assets of a mutual fund, is used to represent the size of a fund.
Performance
Following Sirri and Tufano (1998) , I measure the performance of a fund as its fractional performance rank (RANK i,t ), which represents the percentile of its raw return (RAW) relative to other funds with the same investment objective in the same quarter. To apply a piecewise linear regression to control for the non-linearity in the flowperformance relationship, I continue to follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) to create three performance range variables defined as follows using splines:
Institute (ICI) possesses proprietary share-class level sales data, which are collected directly from each fund. However, ICI maintains a policy not to make the data available to the public.]
LOWPERF i,t represents the bottom performance quintile, MIDPERF i,t represents the middle three performance quintiles, and HIGHPERF i,t represents the top performance quintile.
Since the above-mentioned performance variables measure the relative performance of a fund in its investment objective, I also include a new performance variable, OAWRET i,t , which is the asset-weighted average of the raw holding period returns of all funds with the same investment objective, to control for the effect of investors chasing the absolute performance of an investment objective.
Sirri and Tufano (1998) also use the standard deviation of monthly raw returns to measure the risk of a fund and to study its effect on fund net flows. Instead of incorporating this risk measure directly, I measure the risk-adjusted performance of a fund using the Sharpe ratio (SHARPE), which is computed as:
where i R and f R are the average monthly raw return of fund i and risk-free rate in the past 12 months, respectively, and i σ is the standard deviation of the monthly raw returns of fund i in the past 12 months. 17 Performance ranks and performance range variables  LOWSHARPE i,t , MIDSHARPE i,t , and HIGHSHARPE i,t  are computed in the same fashion as in Equation (3), and used to study the effect of risk-adjusted performance on flows.
Fund Age
The age of a fund (AGE) is also included in the analysis to control for its possible effect.
Number of Investment Objectives in the Fund Family
NUMOBJ represents the number of investment objectives offered in the fund family.
Summary statistics
I compute the medians and means of various characteristics of funds with different load types and report the results in Table 1 
The statistical model
To investigate the role of brokers and financial advisors, I test the effects of fund loads on fund flows, while controlling for other variables in a multivariate regression framework. Consistent with the literature, I measure fund flows as percentage flows.
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In addition, since Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) also employ the dollar flows measure, I
report results using dollar flows as well as a robustness check.
For front-end load funds, I estimate the following random effects regression using only observations from front-end load funds:
18 The percentage flow variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles in these regressions to control for the effects of outliers. 19 Pairwise correlations (not reported here) are computed for all independent variables and found to be low enough (all less than 0.30, with the vast majority less than 0.15) to eliminate concerns over multicollinearity problems in the regressions. As a matter of fact, in addition to the variables included in the model, some other variables are also considered. However, they are highly correlated to variables already included in the model and therefore dropped. The total assets or the number of funds in a family are both highly correlated to NUMOBJ. The total flows into an investment objective are highly correlated to FLOW. I also use measures based on Barclay, Pearson, and Weisbach (1998) to compute fund capital gains overhang, which describes the fraction of the total assets of a fund consisting of unrealized capital gains, to test how tax concerns might affect flows. However, the capital gains overhang variable is found to be highly positively correlated to OAWRET, and therefore is not included. After studying the effects of loads on flows into load funds and comparing the determinants of flows into each of the four load types of funds, I also use the full sample of retail mutual funds to study whether load or no-load funds tend to receive higher flows. I estimate the following random effects panel regression and examine the coefficients of the three load fund dummy variables: and HIGHSHARPE as an alternative performance measure.
The panel regression method is used to account for the fact that observations from the same fund are not independent relative to one another in this time-series crosssectional (panel) data set. The random effects model is chosen over a fixed effects model due to the existence of the load fund dummy variables. Like the fixed effects, the dummy variables are also fund-specific and time invariant and therefore cannot be distinguished from the fixed effects. Consequently, a fixed effects model cannot be estimated with such dummy variables. 22 As a robustness check, I also apply the Fama-MacBeth method in addition to the random effects model and estimate the coefficients for each of the 38 21 In the corporate finance literature, the magnitude of a variable and a dummy based on the same variable have been both included in the same estimation to test the non-linearity in the effect of the variable. For example, Lie (2003) includes both the level of dividend yield and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm pays dividend to test the non-linear effect of dividend yield on firm payout choices. 22 For details of random effects and fixed effects models, please refer to Greene (1997) . I estimate Equation (5) using random effects model to stay consistent with the method used for Equation (6). I also estimate Equation (5) and Equation (6) Table 2 reports the results of separate random effects panel estimation using both percentage flows and dollar flows for the following four fund load types: front-end load funds, back-end load funds, level-load funds, and no-load funds. Results from estimations using alternative performance measures based on the Sharpe ratio are reported in Table 3 .
Estimation Results
The effects of fund loads
Both Table 2 and Table 3 show that higher front-end loads and back-end loads are positively associated with higher flows into front-end load funds and back-end load funds, respectively. 24 These findings document the central role of brokers and financial advisors in the decision making process of investments into load funds.
If, in fact, a load fund investor were the primary decision maker and initiated the investment into load funds herself, we would expect that the load levels should have a negative effect on flows, because, all else being equal, rational investors should stay away from funds with higher load charges. However, it is very unlikely that a load fund 23 The estimates for ASSET and 12B are insignificant when FLOW is used as the dependent variable in Equation (6). 24 The estimate of back-end loads for level-load funds is insignificant, which is not surprising. Because about 90 percent of the back-end loads for level-load funds are a standard one percent, it should not have any effect on flows.
investor will make contact with a load fund first. 25 To do so, the investor would have to conduct a significant amount of research into the investment objective, performance history, and expenses of the fund as well as the characteristics of many other funds for comparison. At a minimum, she would have to obtain the contact information of the fund. Such sophistication apparently does not match the profile of a typical load fund investor. As shown by various surveys [Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996), Investment Company Institute (1997) , and Alexander, Jones, and Nigro (1998)], load fund investors are uninformed in general and consider brokers and financial advisors the most important information source. As a matter of fact, for an investor who is sophisticated enough to conduct the type of research outlined above, it is most likely that she will stay away from load funds completely, since she might also understand that load funds underperform no-load funds after adjusting for loads [Elton et al. (1993 ), Gruber (1996 ), Carhart (1997 , and Morey (2003) ].
The positive effects of loads on fund flows show that the relatively uninformed load fund investors apparently follow the instructions of brokers and financial advisors who are motivated by the higher compensation from higher loads. The positive effect of back-end loads on flows into back-end load funds provides especially convincing evidence of the central role of brokers and financial advisors. For back-end load fund investors, the back-end loads will be reduced by one percentage point for each year money is left invested in the fund. As a result, if load fund investors were the true decision makers, back-end load funds should appeal to long-term investors since the back-end loads will be reduced to zero when they plan to redeem. However, if this scenario were true, the effect of back-end loads should be insignificant as opposed to the significantly positive effect we observe, because the amount of back-end loads should be irrelevant for long-term investors. It should be noted that, although no load is paid initially by the investors to purchase back-end load funds, the fund families still advance the sales charges to the brokers and financial advisors when they sell the fund [O'Neal (1999) ]. As a result, higher back-end loads also provide stronger incentives for the brokers and financial advisors to sell the fund rather than push investors to redeem from the fund. Most likely, the brokers and financial advisors simply manage to sell back-end load funds to unsophisticated investors who are happy to pay the loads at a later time.
In terms of the effects of changes in loads on flows, increases in front-end loads are not significantly related to immediate increases in flows, while increases in back-end loads tend to lead to immediate increases in flows, especially when the effects of riskadjusted performance are controlled. The difference in the effects of changes in frontend loads and back-end loads might be due to the fact that back-end loads tend to be more narrowly distributed. The difference between the 90 th percentile and the 10 th percentile is only about one percent for back-end loads, but exceeds two percent for front-end loads. As a result, any increase in back-end loads is more likely to be noticed by brokers and financial advisors.
A Comparison of the determinants of flows into funds with different load types
In both Table 2 and Table 3, Although investments into both load funds and no-load funds are shown to be sensitive to operating expenses, the sensitivity of no-load fund investors is significantly higher. While a one basis point increase in operating expenses might reduce flows into a 26 It is not surprising to find that the estimate of 12b-1 fees is insignificant for back-end load funds, though. According to O'Neal (1999) , for front-end load and level-load funds, 12b-1 fees are almost entirely paid to brokers and financial advisors as trailing commissions; however, for back-end load funds, only around 25 percent of the 12b-1 fees are paid to brokers and financial advisors, while the rest of the fees are kept by the fund family to recover the sales charges advanced to brokers and financial advisors.
no-load fund by more than five basis points, the same increase only reduces flows into any type of load funds by less than three basis points. This finding indicates brokers and financial advisors are not as enthusiastic in saving expenses as no-load fund investors.
However, since operating expenses, unlike loads, do not increase the income of brokers and financial advisors, we still observe opposite effects of operating expenses and loads on load fund flows.
For both front-end load funds and no-load funds, older funds appear to receive higher flows, while the opposite is true for back-end load funds and level-load funds presumably because, as shown in Table 1 , back-end load funds and level-load funds are considerably younger than front-end funds and no-load funds.
Up to now, the analysis focuses on the results using percentage flows, while the same qualitative results are obtained using dollar flows for most variables and load types.
However, to understand the effect of fund size on flows, the results using percentage flows do not appear to be very informative. Considering that percentage flows are constructed as dollar flows divided by fund size, the effect of (the natural log of) fund size on percentage flows is not surprisingly significantly negative, as shown in both Table 2 and Table 3 No-load funds largely rely on direct sales to investors. 28 Therefore, no-load fund investors are naturally the decision makers of their investment choices, and they rely, to a great extent, on financial media coverage to collect information. As shown by Sirri and 28 No-load funds are also available through mutual fund supermarkets, such as Fidelity and Schwab, and discount brokers. If the fund families pay the supermarkets or discount brokers an annual fee of 25 to 35 basis points, the funds can be sold with a No-Transaction-Fees (NTF) status so that investors do not have to pay normal transaction fees to purchase such funds [see LaPlante (2001) for details of NTF arrangements]. Selling no-load funds through fund supermarkets or discount brokers, either with NTF status or not, only provides the convenience of not having to deal with each individual fund family; it does not provide financial advice. Therefore, the decision-making process for no-load fund investors should not be in any way different whether the purchase is through fund supermarkets and discount brokers or directly from the fund family. As a matter of fact, both sources are considered a direct market distribution channel by Investment Company Institute. It should be noted, though, that a small number of (322 out of 3,170) no-load funds are only available through fee-based financial advisors, and are consequently not included in this study in order to confine no-load fund investors to investors who can make independent investment decisions.
Tufano (1998), larger funds receive higher media coverage. Consequently, larger funds should exhibit better visibility among potential investors and therefore receive higher flows. In addition, larger fund size might also imply a greater number of current shareholders who might make continuing investments into their accounts.
On the other hand, brokers and financial advisors, the true decision makers behind investments into load funds, should understand that fund performance might deteriorate when a fund exceeds its optimal size [Perold and Salomon (1991) , and Indro et al.
(1999)], because funds with larger sizes tend to have higher average trading costs as a result of the tremendous adverse market impacts from trading large blocks of stocks [Loeb (1983) , Keim and Madhavan (1996) , Keim and Madhavan (1998) , Berk and Green (2002) , and Chen et al., (2003)]. As a result, brokers and financial advisors tend to direct investors to smaller funds. Zheng (1999) observes a stronger smart money effect for both load funds and smaller funds. These findings are consistent with such a practice.
Similarities of determinants.
In spite of the observed differences, it should also be noted that many factors have similar qualitative effects on the flows of no-load and various load funds. For example, mutual fund flows are highly autocorrelated regardless of load types, as shown by the significantly positive estimates for lagged flow variables.
The study also reveals that investments into funds with different load types apparently all chase absolute performance, flocking into investment objectives with high average raw returns. All investment decision makers appear to chase relative performance as well, investing disproportionately more in the performance leaders in each investment objective, as shown by the significantly positive and convex relationship between performance percentile ranks and flows. For instance, the estimates from the piecewise regression of the three performance ranges show that, for both front-end load and no-load funds, the same increase in performance percentile ranks leads to almost five times as high percentage flows in the top performance quintile as in the middle three quintiles. As shown in Table 3 , the use of alternative performance measures based on the Sharpe ratio, which measures risk-adjusted performance, does not change the conclusions. In fact, the convex and positive relationship between performance percentile ranks and flows becomes even stronger.
Regardless of load types, funds from fund families investing in a greater number of investment objectives all tend to receive higher flows. This positive spillover effect from having more investment objectives in the fund family indicates that investment decision makers do value the potential options to switch within the fund family.
High-load funds vs. low-load funds.
To test whether the fund flows of high-load funds respond to the determinants differently from those of low-load funds, for both front-end load funds and back-end load funds, I separate each load type into two subsamples by median FLOAD or median BLOAD and repeat the estimations in Table 2 and   Table 3 for each sub-sample. For each load type, I find the same qualitative results for most variables from both sub-samples, with only a few exceptions. For front-end load funds, flows into high-load funds are more sensitive to HIGHPERF, while AGE and NUMOBJ are not significantly related to flows into low-load funds. As far as back-end load funds are concerned, NON12B and NUMOBJ do not appear to significantly affect flows into low-load funds. Due to the overwhelming similarities in the relationships between fund flows and the determinants for high-load and low-load funds, I have omitted the extra tables and discussion.
The changes in loads from 1992 to 2001
Considering that load funds with higher loads are more likely to receive higher flows, I
conjecture that it is more common for fund families to increase rather than decrease fund loads.
Panel A of Table 4 Table 5 reports the results for testing whether load or no-load funds tend to receive higher flows. Model 1 uses performance measures based on raw returns, while Model 2 uses performance measures based on Sharpe ratios.
Do load or no-load funds receive higher flows?
All of the load fund dummies are shown to be significantly negative, suggesting that, all else being equal, a no-load fund receives higher flows (both percentage flows and dollar flows) than any type of load fund. After controlling for these load fund dummy variables, FLOAD and BLOAD exhibit the same positive relationships with fund flows as observed in Table 2 and Table 3 for front-end load and back-end load funds. These findings corroborate the non-linearity in the relationship between fund loads and flows:
no-load funds and high-load funds both receive higher flows than low-load funds. If The existence of a better-informed more sophisticated clientele might explain this phenomenon. It is well documented that load funds do not outperform no-load funds before adjusting for loads, and that they ultimately underperform no-load funds after adjusting for loads. As a result, the better-informed investors might stay away from load funds completely and focus instead on no-load funds. In addition, even though the total market share for load funds has been increasing, an increasing number of funds are also competing in the market. As a result, an average no-load fund might still end up 29 The Wall Street Journal, "Scudder mulls big switch to funds sold by brokers," October 16, 2000, page C1.
receiving higher flows than an average load fund. As evidence, even though the number of no-load funds only accounts for 25 percent of the total number of retail funds, the total assets in no-load funds still account for about 40 percent of total retail fund assets. 
Estimation by investment objectives
The data set used in this paper covers not only domestic equity funds, but also international equity funds, bond funds, and hybrid funds. To test whether the relationships found for the entire data set are robust across different fund groups, I repeat the estimations in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 5 for each of the 19 investment objectives.
In results not reported here, I find that the same qualitative results can be obtained for most variables in most of the 19 investment objectives with the following exceptions:
high quality municipal bond funds, single state municipal bond funds, high yield municipal bond funds, high yield bond funds, and precious metal funds.
In the literature, Jensen's α based on the single-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and multiple-factor alpha based on the Fama-French three-factor model or Carhart four-factor model are often used to measure the performance of domestic equity funds, in addition to performance measures based on raw returns and the Sharpe ratio. To be consistent with the literature, for domestic equity funds (excluding precious metal funds and sector funds), I employ both the single-factor Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) and the Carhart four-factor model [Carhart (1997) ], which is based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, to evaluate their performance:
where it R is the fund return in excess of the monthly T-bill return; RMRF is the valueweighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in excess of the monthly Tbill return; SMB (Small Minus Big) is the difference in returns across small and big equity portfolios; HML (High Minus Low) is the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market equity portfolios; UMD (Up Minus Down) is the difference in returns between equity portfolios with high and low prior returns. SMB, HML, and UMD are incorporated to control for size, value, and momentum effects, respectively. 30 I calculate these measures using monthly returns over the previous 36 months.
After obtaining the estimates for Jensen's α and the Carhart four-factor α, I
follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) in generating performance range variables based on these measures in the same fashion as in Equation (3). I repeat the estimation in Table 2 using these new performance range variables and observations from domestic equity funds. In results not reported here, I find a significantly positive and convex relationship between the new performance measures and fund flows for both load funds and no-load funds.
For funds with any load type, the same increase in the new performance percentile ranks leads to between three times and five times as high percentage flows in the top performance quintile as in the middle three quintiles. These results show that both the relatively sophisticated no-load fund investors and brokers and financial advisors, who are shown to be the true decision makers behind investments into load funds, base their investment decisions on these advanced performance measures.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of brokers and financial advisors behind investments into load (front-end load, back-end load, and level-load) mutual funds using a new data set of all mutual funds, including equity funds, bond funds, and hybrid funds, from 1992 to
2001.
Load funds are primarily sold through brokers and financial advisors, and load fund investors have been shown to be less informed in general. This paper finds that load funds with higher loads and 12b-1 fees, which provide stronger incentives to the brokers and financial advisors but increase the expenses of investors, receive higher flows. This finding reveals that brokers and financial advisors ultimately serve as the true decision makers behind investments into load funds. Brokers and financial advisors exhibit similar behaviors as no-load fund investors, though, in chasing past performance (both raw returns and risk-adjusted returns), and investing in fund families with more options.
They also appear to be sensitive to operating expenses, although they do not seem to be as enthusiastic in saving operating expenses as no-load fund investors. However, while no-load fund investors flock into larger funds with better visibility, brokers and financial advisors are more likely to direct investment dollars into smaller funds, which might experience better performance than larger funds exceeding their optimal size. In addition, I also find that, although no-load funds as a group have lost market share in recent years, a no-load fund still receives higher flows on average than any type of load fund.
In terms of the current investigation by the Securities & Exchange Commission as to whether brokers and financial advisors have abused their influence on load fund investors, the answers from this paper are mixed. On one hand, when there is conflict of interests between investors and brokers or financial advisors, brokers and financial advisors apparently serve their own interests by guiding investors into funds with higher loads. As a result, fund families have been steadily increasing fund loads since the mid 1990s to make their funds more attractive to brokers and financial advisors. On the other hand, when an apparent conflict of interests does not seem to exist, brokers and financial advisors either exhibit similar behaviors as no-load fund investors or show their expertise by directing investors into smaller funds, which might experience better performance.
In addition, the findings in this paper should provide insight to research related to the behaviors of mutual fund investors. In the current literature, for instance, mutual fund investors are often assumed to "choose" funds as if they were all the true decision makers. But, as shown in this paper, the relatively uninformed load fund investors apparently do not "choose" load funds themselves; in reality, brokers and financial advisors "sell" the funds to these investors instead. The identification of the true decision makers behind investments into load funds, which account for 75 percent of total retail mutual funds, might help researchers better understand how investments into mutual funds react to changes in various factors and policies. FLOAD and BLOAD measure the front-end load level and back-end load level of a fund, respectively. 12B represents the 12b-1 fees of a fund, while NON12B is created by subtracting 12b-1 fees from expense ratio to represent operating expenses not related to distribution efforts. ASSET is the total assets of a fund. RAW is the raw quarterly return of a fund. SHARPE stands for the Sharpe ratio, a measure of risk-adjusted performance, which is calculated as average monthly return in excess of T-bill return divided by standard deviation of monthly returns in the past 12 months. FLOW measures dollar flows, and is defined as the change in total assets in excess of appreciation and assets added through acquisition. PFLOW measures percentage flows and is defined as the asset growth rate of a fund due to dollar flows. PFLOW is winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to control for the effects of outliers. AGE represents the age of a fund. For front-end load funds, I estimate the following random effects regression using only observations from front-end load funds, while excluding observations from funds closed to new investors:
PFLOW measures percentage flows, and is defined as the asset growth rate of a fund due to dollar flows. FLOAD measures the front-end load level. ∆FLOAD measures the change in front-end load. 12B represents the 12b-1 fees of a fund, while NON12B is created by subtracting 12b-1 fees from expense ratio to represent operating expenses not related to distribution efforts. LASSET is the natural log of ASSET, the total assets of a fund. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998) , I measure the performance of a fund as its fractional performance rank (RANK i,t ), which represents the percentile of its raw return relative to other funds with the same investment objective in the same quarter, and create three performance range variables defined as follows using splines: [RANK i, t , 0.6] , and HIGHPERF i,t = min [RANK i, t , 0.2] . LOWPERF represents the bottom performance quintile, MIDPERF represents the middle three performance quintiles, and HIGHPERF represents the top performance quintile. AGE represents the age of a fund. NUMOBJ represents the number of investment objectives offered in the fund family. OAWRET is the asset-weighted average of the raw holding period returns of all funds with the same investment objective. i u is the random disturbance characterizing the i th fund and is constant through time. FLOAD is replaced by BLOAD, which measures the back-end load level, when back-end load and level-load funds are studied, or dropped when no-load funds are studied, and only the relevant data are used for each load type. ∆FLOAD is also replaced by ∆BLOAD for back-end load funds. If FLOW, which measures dollar flows, the change in total assets in excess of appreciation and assets added through acquisition, is used as the dependent variable, ASSET and FLOW (t-1) will be used to represent fund size and flows in the previous quarter instead. The percentage flow variable is winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to control for the effects of outliers. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. a , b , and c indicate that the coefficients for each type of load funds are statistically different from the corresponding coefficients in the no-load fund regression at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. MIDSHARPE i,t , and HIGHSHARPE i,t , which are computed in the same fashion as the percentage variables based on raw returns, are used instead as an alternative performance measure. Sharpe ratio measures the risk-adjusted performance of a fund, and is calculated as average monthly return in excess of T-bill return divided by standard deviation of monthly returns in the past 12 months. As a result, to study the determinants of percentage flows for front-end load funds, I estimate the following random effects regression using only observations from front-end load funds, while excluding observations from funds closed to new investors:
PFLOW measures percentage flows, and is defined as the asset growth rate of a fund due to dollar flows. FLOAD measures the front-end load level. ∆FLOAD measures the change in front-end load. 12B represents the 12b-1 fees of a fund, while NON12B is created by subtracting 12b-1 fees from expense ratio to represent operating expenses not related to distribution efforts. LASSET is the natural log of ASSET, the total assets of a fund. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998) , I measure the performance of a fund as its fractional performance rank (RANK i,t ), which represents the percentile of its Shape ratio relative to other funds with the same investment objective in the same quarter, and create three performance range variables defined as follows using splines: LOWSHARPE i,t = min [RANK i,t LOWSHARPE represents the bottom performance quintile, MIDSHARPE represents the middle three performance quintiles, and HIGHSHARPE represents the top performance quintile. AGE represents the age of a fund. NUMOBJ represents the number of investment objectives offered in the fund family. OAWRET is the asset-weighted average of the raw holding period returns of all funds with the same investment objective. i u is the random disturbance characterizing the i th fund and is constant through time. FLOAD is replaced by BLOAD, which measures the back-end load level, when back-end load and level-load funds are studied, or dropped when no-load funds are studied, and only the relevant data are used for each load type. ∆FLOAD is also replaced by ∆BLOAD for back-end load funds. If FLOW, which measures dollar flows, the change in total assets in excess of appreciation and assets added through acquisition, is used as the dependent variable, ASSET and FLOW (t-1) will be used to represent fund size and flows in the previous quarter instead. The percentage flow variable is winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to control for the effects of outliers. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. a , b , and c indicate that the coefficients for each type of load funds are statistically different from the corresponding coefficients in the no-load fund regression at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively. Decrease  1993  79  126  24  53  61  73  11  29  8  20  3  9  1994  98  102  42  60  73  42  28  36  9  5  19  31  1995  26  28  17  9  32  19  8  2  3  0  5  2  1996  40  36  31  16  10  20  38  11  7  8  31  3  1997  180  27  104  15  85  12  31  27  14  5  17  22  1998  98  33  75  12  75  21  37  5  21  3  16  2  1999  114  31  86  7  34  24  4  3  1  0  3  3  2000  119  50  99  10  31  40  14  1  10  0  4  1  2001  35  7  21  3  17  4  2  0  0  0  2  0  Total  789  440  499  185  290  255  173  114  73  41  100 PFLOW measures percentage flows, and is defined as the asset growth rate of a fund due to dollar flows. FLDUMMY, BLDUMMY, and LLDUMMY, take the value of one if the fund is a front-end load fund, backend load fund, and level-load fund, respectively, and zero otherwise. FLOAD and BLOAD measure the levels of front-end loads and back-end loads, respectively. Both load fund dummy variables and actual load levels are included to control for the possible non-linearity in the effects of fund loads. 12B represents the 12b-1 fees of a fund, while NON12B is created by subtracting 12b-1 fees from expense ratio to represent operating expenses not related to distribution efforts. LASSET is the natural log of ASSET, which is the total assets of a fund. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998) , I measure the performance of a fund as its fractional performance rank (RANK i,t ), which represents the percentile of its raw return relative to other funds with the same investment objective in the same quarter, and create three performance range variables defined as follows using splines: LOWPERF i,t = min [RANK i,t . LOWPERF represents the bottom performance quintile, MIDPERF represents the middle three performance quintiles, and HIGHPERF represents the top performance quintile. AGE represents the age of a fund. NUMOBJ represents the number of investment objectives offered in the fund family. OAWRET is the asset-weighted average of the raw holding period returns of all funds with the same investment objective. i u is the random disturbance characterizing the i th fund and is constant through time. If FLOW, which measures dollar flows, the change in total assets in excess of appreciation and assets added through acquisition, is used as the dependent variable, ASSET and FLOW (t-1) will be used to represent fund size and flows in the previous quarter instead. The percentage flow variable is winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to control for the effects of outliers. Model 2 uses alternative performance range variables based on the Sharpe ratio, LOWSHARPE i,t , MIDSHARPE i,t , and HIGHSHARPE i,t , which are computed in the same fashion as the performance range variables based on raw returns. Sharpe ratio measures the risk-adjusted performance of a fund, and is calculated as average monthly return in excess of T-bill return divided by standard deviation of monthly returns in the past 12 months. p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.
Figure 1
The distribution of retail mutual funds among different load types Retail mutual funds can be disaggregated into four categories by load types: front-end load funds, back-end load funds, level-load funds, and no-load funds. Front-end load funds charge a front-end load and a 12b-1 fee but not a back-end load; back-end load funds charge a back-end load and a 12b-1 fee but not a frontend load; level-load funds charge a much smaller back-end load (less than two percent) and a 12b-1 fee (generally greater than that of a back-end load fund) but not a front-end load; and no-load funds charge neither a front-end load nor a back-end load, but might charge a 12b-1 fee (if any) less than 25 basis points. Load funds are generally sold through brokers and financial advisors, while no-load funds largely rely on direct sales to investors. The loads and 12b-1 fees are used primarily to compensate brokers and financial advisors and to pay for distribution expenses. No Load
